Previous work on political support suggests that alienation from the regime may arise from discontent which is progressively targeted at first the authorities, then the institutions, and eventually the political system.! Political parties are visible and important institutions. If public evaluations of parties, and the party system, have become increasingly negative across time, as Dennis contends, regardless of the cause the possibility exists that this negativity may spill over to influence judgements of the regime as a whole. 2 In short, alienation from the party system may undermine diffuse support for the broader political regime.
This article explores the theoretical association between discontent with political parties and diffuse political distrust. Because the type of party system that exists in a country could influence this relationship, we compare empirical evidence across two multi-party systems, those of Norway and Sweden, and a two-party system, that of the United States. First we chart the recent overall trends in political support in the three countries. Then we investigate three broad channels through which political parties may influence public support for government in general: the structural aspects of the party system, the public's cognitive judgements of the parties as representatives of their policy interests, and the possibility that a negative rejection of political parties as undesirable institutions may spill over to citizen evaluations of government more generally. The treatment of political parties is primarily from that of parties in the mass public, although the discussion draws upon information about parties as organizations and legislative actors.
CONCEPTS AND MEASURES
Support for the political system has generally been examined in terms of two different dimensions -political efficacy and trust in government. 3 These two dimensions provide a description or theory of the relationship between the citizen and political authorities and institutions. As originally formulated, efficacy was concerned with an input function, 'the feeling that individual political action does have or can have an impact upon the political process'.4 Trust, by comparison, deals with an output function. It reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in accordance with the normative expectations held by the public. Citizen expectations of how government should operate include, among other criteria, that it be fair, equitable, honest, efficient and responsive to society's needs. In brief, an expression of trust in government (or synonymously political confidence and support) is a summary judgement that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny.
In recent years the concept of political efficacy has been further differentiated into subcomponents which reflect this distinction between input and output functions. One dimension, internal efficacy, represents individuals' selfperception that they are capable and competent enough to participate in political acts.5 The other component, external political efficacy, denotes the judgement that an individual and the public can have an impact on the political process because government institutions will respond to their needs.
The concepts of external efficacy and political trust have a good deal in common; in particular, both focus on the performance of government and political leaders rather than on an assessment of one's own capabilities. For example, without acting in an honest and efficient manner government cannot hope to foster the belief that it will either be capable of responding to citizen needs in the future or that it will be willing to respond to those needs. Trust in government and external efficacy are, therefore, closely interrelated concepts which jointly tap system responsiveness.
In theory, political parties could influence both citizen competence and government responsiveness. Nevertheless, the substantive focus here is the impact parties have on the perceived responsiveness of the political system, rather than individual political competence.
Survey indicators of perceived government responsiveness have generally been drawn from a standardized battery of trust or external efficacy items. The trust items typically ask the survey respondents if the political leaders and government can be trusted to do what is right, if they are honest, fair and competent. The external efficacy items generally ask if elected officials stay in touch with the voters, care what people like them think and are interested in their opinions or just seeking their vote. Measures of external efficacy and trust are usually highly correlated and customarily exhibit the same trends across time, thus suporting the assumption that they tap the same underlying and more abstract concept, system responsiveness.
COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN POLITICAL TRUST
Cross-cultural comparative research is often curtailed by the absence of empirical evidence of a comparable nature from different countries. The data that are available on trust and efficacy, however, are somewhat less restrictive. A number of directly comparable items are available in the American, Norwegian and Swedish national election surveys that have been conducted in these countries over the years (see the Appendix for a description of these survey questions). The Scandinavian surveys were patterned after the US studies; thus trust or efficacy items appearing in any of the studies have the same question wording. The one limitation is that not all of the potential items have been asked in the different countries, or for all the time periods. Table 1 summarizes the responses to the relevant survey items that were asked in each country from 1968 to 1986. The largest set of trust and efficacy questions have been asked in the American studies, but only those which overlap with the Scandinavian studies are included in Table 1 .
If the same survey items had been available for the three countries, the level of perceived political responsiveness could be directly compared. Unfortunately, Sweden and Norway have only one item in common, 'parties are interested only in votes not in the public's opinion', and only for two points in time, thereby limiting a direct comparison of these countries. In 1968 and 1973, however, the data suggest that external efficacy was substantially higher in Sweden than in Norway.
A more complete comparison can be made between the United States and the other two countries. Across the period from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s Norwegians have expressed far more trust in their government and political leaders than Americans have. Swedish and American citizens, on the other hand, have exhibited roughly the same level of external efficacy, although from 1968 to 1976 the data suggest that Swedes were more likely than Americans to express a positive sense of efficacy. For example, they were more likely to say that parties were interested in their opinions as well as their votes. After 1976, the relative level of external efficacy for the two countries reversed, and since then a larger proportion of Americans have expressed the belief that public officials care about them. Undoubtedly there are cultural factors which partially account for these across-country differences in the responses to the political trust and efficacy items. No doubt differences in the party structures, the stronger acceptance of the welfare state ideology in Norway, the degree of polarization or homogeneity in each society, the relative incidence of government scandals and a number of other elements contribute to these differences. But as Robert Dahl has suggested, a systematic explanation for the variation in political allegiance across cultures goes beyond any available data. 6 Moreover, with only three 
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::: 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 19841986 Note: Figure countries for comparison it would be impossible to test these cultural-level explanations. A more fruitful pursuit is to search for similarities or differences in the trends and for the factors which explain those shifts in the three countries. The overall trends in political trust for the three countries have not been compared in any previous academic research, but they are quite fascinating and varied. Trust showed a particularly abrupt decline in all three countries between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s (see Figure 1 ). After that, support recovered in Norway, while it continued to decline in Sweden and the United States. In the latter two countries the downward trend was temporarily halted -between 1980 and 1984 in the United States and between 1979 and 1982 in Sweden -but thereafter again resumed. The short-lived upturn in the United States was apparently based on the public's response to the image of strong leadership conveyed by Reagan during his first term in office. 7 After the 1984 election, however, the Reagan Administration was unable to fulfil either conservative expectations for further cuts in welfare spending or liberal hopes for increased prosperity shared equally by all. Thus trust again turned down sharply even before the onset of the Iran-Contra scandal. 8 In Sweden, citizen expectations were also largely unfulfilled by the non-socialist government that ruled from 1976 to 1982, after forty-four years of Social Democratic control. 9 The result was that support first declined under the non-socialist coalition and then briefly levelled off (1979-82), before continuing its downward trend when the Social Democrats returned to power after 1982.
The similarities and differences in the trend for each country over the entire period for which data are available suggest that there were some common factors influencing trust early on, but that there were system differences which allowed Norway to escape from the more enduring deterioration in support which has afflicted both Swedish and American politics. During the years between 1964 and 1973 there were world events and social problems which affected all of these countries. These included the Vietnam war, growing stagflation, increasing criticism of the welfare system, concerns about taxation, and concern about the environment.!O At the same time, there were also issues that on the surface seem unique to each country, such as Watergate in the United States, the EEC vote in Norway, and regional politics and the nuclear power controversy in Sweden, which could help account for the trends.!! Examining the alternative explanations for political trust in each country would be enlightening and help to promote the development of a general theory of perceived government responsiveness. Here the goal is more modest. The aim is to determine if the same party-related factors are associated with political support in each country, as well as help explain the trends across time. The argument here is that the differences in the party systems of these countries help to explain in large part the dramatic difference in the trend for Norway on the one hand, and Sweden and the United States on the other hand. We therefore turn to a discussion of the impact that political parties have on trust in government.
In the next section we empirically investigate the role that protest parties can play in reducing discontent and restoring trust in a multi-party system. Following that, we examine the impact which the perceived issue positions of the parties and a general feeling of detachment from political parties have on trust in government. The final section of the article then presents a multivariate analysis demonstrating how the party measures, examined in the earlier sections, relate to trust in government when taken in total. The familiar distinction between two-party and multi-party systems is relevant for the development of political trust among citizens in a number of ways. Some of these involve public perceptions about electoral choices and representation, while others depend on how the party system influences government decision making. Tn a democracy, legitimacy of the government rests upon the belief that one's interests are reflected or represented in the decision-making arena. Tn theory, party systems that are more flexible, that is, those which allow for the rise of new parties that spring up to represent emerging political interests, should deter the development of enduring political alienation. Since two-party systems are built on electoral law discouraging to third parties, voters with policy positions that deviate from those of the two dominant political actors will easily become alienated because they cannot find any representative for their own position among the established parties, and any new party is unlikely to endure.
In these terms a multi-party system is potentially more flexible than a twoparty system. A multi-party system, where some form of proportional representation is at work, is more conducive to the formation of new parties. 12 Protest parties can be effectively used, therefore, to channel discontent back into the decision-making arena in multi-party systems, whereas this is not possible in a rigid two-party system.
While two-party systems are relatively more rigid than multi-party systems, electoral laws vary considerably so some of the latter systems are more flexible than others. A number of factors actually constrain the degree of flexibility in multi-party systems.13 For example, the thresholds of representation are 13 In addition to factors influencing the rise of new parties, the flexibility of multi-party systems is constrained in other ways. First, they vary considerably in the number of parties that are competing for office. In Scandinavia, for example, Denmark has the highest number of major parties and Sweden the smallest, with Norway in between (the numbers are eleven, five and seven respectively for the period of our study). Some of the smallest parties running in the election have little chance of representation, and thus can be compared to third parties in two-party systems. Secondly, the specialization of the party structure (e.g. an Agrarian party, a Labour party, etc.) might limit the relevance of the parties for the broader electorate. There is thus conflict between the degree of specialization, which gives major interest groups 'their' party, and the wish of voters to have viable alternative parties from which to choose.
Thirdly, since confidence may be influenced by the functioning and outcomes of government, the way governments are created and operate becomes important. Multi-party systems frequently depend on coalition and minority governments. Coalition governments may not provide preferred policies because the parties forming the government must compromise on major political questions. Although the portrait of minority governments as poor performers has recently been challenged (see K. Strom, 'Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies', American Political Science Review, 79 (1985) , 738-54), a minority government may alienate some of the coalition supporters, as the implemented policies will diverge from the policy positions these voters supported at the election. Similarly, compromises due to coalitional bargaining and/or especially crucial in determining the probability that a new party may convert votes into seats. Among the Scandinavian cases Sweden is by far the most rigid in that a party must receive at least 4 per cent of the total vote before it can gain representation in the parliament. Norway is more flexible: it has no formal threshold but a representational system heavily influenced by the regional dispersion of voters. 14 Given these differences in election rules, new party formation has been more prevalent in Norway than in Sweden. A number of new parties were formed in Norway during the early 1970s. For example, the dispute over whether Norway should join the European Economic Community produced a deep split in the Liberal party and the pro-membership faction split off to form the Liberal People's party. Shortly thereafter the most conservative elements in Norway found a means of expression through the newly formed Progress party (formerly called the Anders Lange party). Sweden, on the other hand, had no significant change in its traditional five-party system between 1909, when proportional representation was introduced, and 1988 when the Green party gained 5.5 per cent of the national vote and twenty seats in parliament. 1s Similarly to Sweden, it is virtually impossible in the United States for third parties or alternative candidates to gain any degree of enduring popular support or organizational continuity. 16 In recent years some notable candidates of both the right and the left, such as George Wallace and John Anderson, have gained visible percentages of the popular vote in the 1968 and 1980 presidential elections. But in each case they have been unable to institutionalize this support through the establishment of an ongoing organized party.
Theoretically we would expect trust in government to remain higher in political systems where citizens feel that their preferences are represented in the political arena by a party which reflects their interests. We would also predict that in a society with a flexible party system, discontent with government might lead to the formation of protest parties which would help channel dissatisfaction back into the electoral arena. A rigid party structure, however, would promote the growth of political alienation among people who become discontented with all the established parties if there is little hope of alternative parties being founded to represent their preferences. With a more flexible party system, on the other hand, we would expect to find a strong correlation between support for protest parties and political disaffection, whereas those who identify with the establishment parties should have more confidence in government. In other bargaining with the opposition may lead to inconsistent policy making, instability (i.e., short-lived governments) and political turbulence, thus weakening the performance of the government. In turn, this might be detrimental to the level of confidence among the public.
words, the political parties would be the vehicle used for expressing feelings of political discontent.
The empirical evidence from Norway, Sweden and the United States appears to fit quite well with these theoretical predictions. In Norway, for example, there is a strong correlation between party preference and political trust which is heavily influenced by the partisanship of the current incumbents. Supporters of the Progress party (FrP), the protest party on the right, were consistently the most distrusting, especially in 1973. By comparison, supporters of the incumbent governing parties were regularly the least distrusting (see Table 2 ). In 1973 the relationship between incumbency and trust was somewhat less clear, because a coalition of centrist bourgeois parties (Liberals, Christians and the agrarian Centre party) took over the government from the preceding minority Labour government one year before the election. However, in the other years the in-out pattern in political confidence is more apparent. From 1973 to 1981 the Labour party ruled, but from 1981 to the spring of 1986 the Conservative party controlled the government, part of the time in coalition with the Christian and Centre parties. At each point in time supporters of the incumbent parties were the most trustful. The dynamics of channelling discontent through protest parties is also evident in the Norwegian data in Table 2 . Between 1973 and 1985 the rise in confidence which occurred in Norway was greatest among FrP supporters. As the Progress party became institutionalized it provided a voice for a significant minority of disenchanted people (it has generally received the endorsement of 3 to 5 per cent in party preference polls, and 8 per cent of all voters in recent years select the Fr Pas their second choice among parties), thus reducing their feeling of distrust. The renewed trust among FrP supporters seems to have occurred in response to the increased influence of the FrP in the political decision-making arena. It gained parliamentary representation for the first time in the 1973 election and since then has played an increasingly important strategic role in determining which block controls the government. But perhaps even more important than the number of seats they controlled in the parliament has been the fact that the other parties and political leaders began to take the Progressives seriously. As the political influence of the FrP has increased, the level of trust among its supporters has improved dramatically. For apparently similar reasons the second highest rate of increased trust was found among those supporting the Conservative party, the long-term opposition party which had been excluded from a decisive role in government throughout the post-war period until it took over the government in the 1981 election.
In short, the data in Table 2 demonstrate rather clearly that the political parties are used as the vehicle for expressing and alleviating political discontent in Norway. A very different pattern emerges, however, for Sweden and the United States. The incumbency effect can be seen in the data for both these countries, but much less so than in Norway. For example, in the United States the Democrats controlled the Presidency from 1964 to 1968 and from 1976 to 1980, and during those periods Democratic identifiers gave the political system more support than Republicans did, and the reverse was true in periods of Republican rule. But the incumbency effect on trust should not be overstated. The difference in the level of trust for Democrats and Republicans is only occasionally significant (1972 and 1986 for example), and pales by comparison with the partisan differences found in Norway. Unlike in Norway,it is quite obvious thatin the United States parties were not used to channelling anti-system sentiment back into the political arena. Rather, supporters of both parties have become increasingly alienated from government even during periods when their preferred party controlled the federal executive branch.
For Sweden the dynamics of incumbency are even less apparent than in the United States, although some traces of the expected pattern can be seen.!7 During the 1968-76 period of Social Democratic control, supporters of the incumbent party were more trusting than those voting for the other parties (see Table 2 ). But again the differences are not large, and confidence in government declined more rapidly during this period among Social Democrats than among supporters of the bourgeois parties. The in-out pattern is even less clear during the years of non-socialist government (1976-82). Incumbency, gained by a non-socialist coalition (including the Centre, Liberal and Conservative parties) for the first time in fortyfour years, failed to produce a significant increase in system support. In fact, during the first non-socialist term in office, cynicism increased dramatically among all party supporters except the Communists.
The reason for the failure of the non-socialist government to increase levels of trust among its supporters might be found in the recurring problems within the coalition. On two occasions, in 1978 and 1981, the policy controversies became so serious that the majority government broke down.1s This might have worked to alienate bourgeois voters who had nurtured hopes of a strong non-socialist government replacing the long-term hegemony of the Left in Sweden. Likewise, the return to power of the Social Democrats in 1982 failed to produce a surge in confidence among that party's adherents, but it did prompt another dramatic deterioration oftrust among non-socialist voters. It would appear that the parties in Sweden and the United States have failed to fulfil citizen expectations of government performance for an extensive period, whereas the more flexible party system in Norway has provided for the channelling of discontent back into the normal political decision-making arena.
COGNITIVE JUDGEMENTS
OF PARTIES AS REPRESENT A TIVE
INSTITUTIONS
The above findings, however, reflect distinctions and are based on a macro-level hypothesis employing the flexibility of the party system as an explanation for varying degrees of trust in the different countries. The corresponding individuallevel mechanism connecting political support and partisan preference consists, theoretically, of people's perceptions of party representation. As suggested earlier, the relationship between party choice and distrust may reflect judgements of whether or not the parties adequately represent the citizens' policy or ideological preferences. Even without the formation of new parties, multi-party systems may alleviate distrust because these systems traditionally provide more options for the citizens. In theory the issue differences and ideological distances between parties should exhibit greater variance and be clearer in a multi-party than a two-party system. In the latter, the laws of competition frequently move the parties towards the centre, thereby raising concerns about whether any meaningful differences exist between them. 19 It has been argued that parties in the United States failed to provide meaningful issue representation, thus contributing to increased distrust, in two major ways. Firstly, some writers claim that political distrust grew in the United States because citizens increasingly failed to see important distinctions between what the parties stood for.20 This sentiment is frequently reflected in the common phrase, 'there's not a dime's worth of difference between the parties'.
Secondly, others argued tha t differences between the parties still exis ted, bu t tha t neither party offered desirable or preferred solutions to society'S problems. 21 According to this view, if citizen discontent with the inability of the parties to provide solutions for social problems persists over an extended period of time, this dissatisfaction may become generalized to other political institutions and the government as a whole. Citizens generally do not expect a political party with which they do not identify to promote policies they favour. But, when one's preferred party fails to provide satisfactory policy choices, the situation is ripe for the development of broader discontent.
Again, we might expect flexible multi-party and more rigid two-party systems to respond differently to these problems of representation. As noted above, a multiparty system simply offers more possibilities that at least some party will represent one's interests, thereby acting to forestall overall growth in distrust. Nevertheless, this does not negate the basic hypothesis that discontent should be higher among those who feel that their preferred party does not represent them as they would like. In a multi-party system the individual merely has more options when selecting a preferred party.
Theoretically, of course, citizens may not even focus on their own party when judging how well they are represented. If one's own party is out of power, what the incumbents are doing may be cognitively more salient and politically more relevant than what one's own party is proposing by way of alternative policies. Likewise, in a multi-party system, especially one with a coalition government, citizens may consider the extent to which they are represented by coalition blocs rather than their own party or any particular party.
We developed several empirical measures to test these various hypotheses. Given that issue and policy concerns were not the same across the countries, we chose to use left-right perceptions of the parties, rather than specific issue questions, to gauge the extent to which citizens felt the parties represented their interests. The surveys in each country contained a comparable liberal to conservative or left to right ideology scale on which the respondents were asked to place themselves and the various political parties. These measures allowed us to compute perceived distances between parties, as well as the distance between the respondent's own placement and the placement of the parties. We assume that the smaller the distance between two parties, the more similar they are perceived to be. Likewise, the greater the distance between a respondent's self-placement and where they place a party, the less that party is perceived to represent the interests of the respondent. Contrary to the hypotheses raised above, or the suggestions of even very recent literature, the argument connecting distrust with a lack of perceived differences between the parties was soundly rejected in each country.22 In all three countries more than a majority of respondents perceived significant differences between the parties. But,moreimportantly, these perceived differences were never very strongly or consistently correlated with political trust (the strongest Pearson r occasionally reached only 0.08). In brief, the balance of trust or distrust in a country does not hinge on whether or not the parties take sharply differing ideological positions.
What does seem to influence trust is not party similarity, but a concern with whether one's preferences are adequately represented by some party. Which party formed the focus of these evaluations, however, varied by political system.
In Norway and the United States the strongest correlations with political distrust were found with measures of the distance between the respondent's own ideological position and where he or she placed the incumbent party (see Table 3 ). Data from both of these countries produces a pattern of correlations that would be evident if distrust reflected dissatisfaction with the incumbent's policies and a preference for the ideological orientation of the out-of-power party. That is, distrust is positively correlated with the distance that the respondent's preferred issue position is from the incumbent party or bloc, and negatively correlated with distance from the opposition party.
In Sweden, on the other hand, only 1985 produced any evidence of an incumbency affect. Unlike the other two countries, political support in Sweden was more strongly associated with ideological assessments of one's preferred party (that is, the party the respondent voted for in the last election). Occasionally in Norway and the United States there are significant correlations between trust and distance from one's preferred party, but these relationships appear only inconsistently, and even when statistically significant they are very weak.
Among Swedish citizens, those who feel most distant from their preferred party, regardless of which party they prefer, are the least supportive of government and the political system more generally (see Table 3 ). Moreover, this finding is evident in all three years examined.
Why should Swedish voters exhibit such a consistent pattern of correlations between ideological distance from their preferred party and distrust of government? Perhaps part of the answer arises from the fact that the party system in Sweden is both rigid and one-dimensional. 23 Under such a system voters are less likely to see the other parties as providing viable alternatives to their own party. If they are dissatisfied with their own party but see nowhere else to go, they may become increasingly cynical about the system as a whole. dissatisfied with the policies of the Democratic party, but did not see the Republican party as a viable alternative. 24 In addition, the Social Democrats have defined and controlled the government for most of the past half-century in Sweden. Perhaps when it is nearly impossible for some other party to gain control of government, it may be those who want a very different approach from their preferred party (i.e., those most distant from it) who become the most frustrated and eventually the most discontented with the system. Whatever the explanation, the pattern is consistent and prevalent in Sweden but not in the other two countries. Swedish voters definitely focus more on the actions of their own party when judging representational quality, rather than on the ideological orientation of the current incumbents.
Before leaving the discussion of Table 3 , two other patterns of correlations are noteworthy. The first concerns the Progressive party in Norway, especially in 1973 and 1977. The strong negative correlations observed for the Progressives indicate that those respondents who felt closest to the placement of the Progressive party on the left-right scale were also the most distrusting of government. Since the Progressives are generally perceived as a right-wing party, this means that those preferring conservative policies were the most alienated, thus substantiating findings presented earlier. However, the correlation drops sharply in 1985 (from -0.51 in 1977 to -0.06). Apparently, as the Progressives gained some real political influence, ideological representation became less important among Progressive party loyalists as a factor affecting their political trust.
The other interesting pattern of correlations in Table 3 occurs for Independents in the United States. With only one exception, the 1984 distance from Democrats, those Independents who were most distant ideologically from either party were the least trusting. These correlations suggest that Independents felt that neither party adequately represented their ideological interests; thus their general lack of confidence in government. We return to a fuller discussion of this possibility in the next section. To conclude briefly, the data presented above suggest that distrust of government grows when people have definite policy preferences which they believe have gone unrepresented, rather than when they perceive only minimal differences between the parties.
NEGATIVITY TOWARDS THE PARTY SYSTEM AND POLITICAL TRUST
In addition to their representational role, parties perform other important political functions, one of which is to integrate citizens into the political system. Generally this is accomplished through mobilizing citizens to participate in various electoral and political activities. More universally, however, parties promote a positive attitude towards the system by fostering a psychological sense of partisan identification. Party identification is far more widespread in most democracies than is membership of party organizations or involvement in campaign-related events. In theory, therefore, attachment to a political party, providing it is not a revolutionary party, should promote positive sentiment towards the party system and, indirectly, trust in the political regime.
Since the mid-1960s, however, strength of party identification has declined in many Western democracies. Indeed, Figure 2 reveals that Norway, Sweden and the United States all experienced a decrease in partisan attachment during the past two decades. But, once again, the pattern of change in partisanship was different for the three countries. From the mid-1960s to the early 1970, all three countries witnessed a similar decline in strength of partisanship, but after that point the trends for the countries diverge. After 1973 partisanship in Norway recovered, virtually to the level of the 1960s. In the United States the decline stopped, but no recovery was observed. Sweden, by contrast, shows a marked deterioration in strength of partisanship that continues to the present time. 
. Trends in strength of party identification in Norway, Sweden and the United States
The aggregate trends in strength of partisanship for Norway and Sweden are quite similar to the overall trend for political support, thereby suggesting that shifts in party identification for those two countries might help explain change in political trust. An examination of the individual-level correlations between strength of partisanship and trust partially confirms this hypothesis. In Norway, the 1973 lowpoint for partisanship may have contributed to the drop in trust at that time, but the later correlations are so weak that they could account for very little of the resurgence in trust (see Table 4 ).
For Sweden, on the other hand, the correlations between strength of party attachment and political trust are moderately strong and consistently evident across time (see Table 4 ). Independents in Sweden were significantly more distrusting in every year than were stronger identifiers. The fact that both the aggregate trends for partisanship and trust are parallel, and that the individuallevel correlations between these variables are significant, provides very strong evidence suggesting that the deterioration of political support in Sweden is rooted in attitudes towards the party system. Furthermore, the findings presented here are consistent with those for the distance measures reported in the previous section. No doubt weaker identifiers are more likely than stronger identifiers to feel that their preferred party (i.e., the one they voted for) was further from them ideologically, regardless of which party they supported in the most recent election.
In the United States the pattern of correlations is similar to that for Sweden, albeit much weaker. Though the correlations are rarely significant, Independents in the United States are consistently less trusting than stronger partisans. Moreover, when Independents are compared with the strongest identifiers, the differences in levels oftrust are often fairly large (for example, see 1980 and 1986 in Table 4 ). The difference in the pattern of relationships for the two countries arises from the overall trends. After 1972 shifts in partisanship for the United States cannot help to explain the continued downward trend in trust, as there is simply no further growth in the percentage of Independents.
Some other factor associated with strength of partisanship may, however, help explain the recent shifts in trust, as it is apparent from Table 4 that Independents in the United States became substantially more distrusting over the period between 1972 and 1986 than strong identifiers did. Perhaps it was the relative evaluations given to the parties by these groups which influenced their confidence in government, rather than merely their strength of attachment. Indeed, what the growth in Independents reflects about partisan evaluations has been a topic of considerable controversy. Some writers argue that the public is increasingly negative towards all political parties, 2 5 others suggest that they are simply becoming more neutral. 26 Of course, even neutrality (i.e., feeling neither positive or negative towards the parties) may have adverse consequences for the political system if it represents alienation in the sense of meaninglessness (using Seeman's classification).27 Because parties are very important for aggregating public interests and mobilizing voters, the political influence that parties have relative to other special interest organizations will definitely be reduced if a substantial proportion of the population no longer sees a meaningful role for parties or sees parties as irrelevant to the political process.
The number of parties that citizens feel neutral towards (measured, for example, as ratings of 50 on a scale ranging from 0 to 100) has shifted across time in the three countries under investigation. Only for Norway, however, does the aggregate trend parallel the trend for trust. Between 1973 and 1985 the number of parties, on the average, that a person felt neutral towards declined in Norway (see Figure 3a) . For Sweden, feeling neutral towards parties increased between 1979 and 1982, but then declined in 1985 (see Figure 3b) . Neutrality towards parties in the United States, by comparison, increased from the mid1960s to the mid-1970s, and levelled off after that (Figure 3c) . Furthermore, at the individual level neutrality and system support have not been strongly correlated. Only in Sweden does feeling neutral towards the parties consistently have a statistically significant influence on support for the political system (see Table 5 ). In general, neutral feelings towards political parties are not correlated with distrust of government.
Certainly there is more cause for concern when people are negative towards political parties than when they are neutral. After all, parties are institutions; thus, in Easton's framework differentiating the authorities, institutions and the regime, dissatisfaction with parties represents a more deep-seated, diffuse level of discontent. 28 Nevertheless, the target of that discontent may again vary from the Table 5 TABLE 5 Political Table entries are Pearson r correlations. In the Trust Index, low value = trust, high value = distrust. Measures of party ratings were computed from feeling thermometers ranging from 0 to 100 degrees for Norway and the United States. For Sweden ratings were based on a scale that ranged from -10 to + 10. 'Neutral towards parties' refers to the number of parties rated at the midpoint or 'don't know'. Rating of 'Government' or 'Own party' uses the single rating scale for those specified parties. 'Own party' was defined as the one the respondent voted for in the election of the designated year. The average measure ('tot rate') is the mean rating for all the political parties in the system. 'Number of parties rated low' indicates the number of parties rated at or below 25 degrees, or at or below -2 in Sweden.
party of the current incumbents, to all the parties in the system. Clearly, we would expect that the impact of party discontent on political alienation will depend on the target of that dissatisfaction. Employing a set of measures based on thermometer ratings of the political parties, we found a set of correlations between trust and party ratings that were similar to those produced with the distance measures in the previous section. Sweden again exhibits the only consistent set of correlations with ratings of the respondent's own party (see Table 5 ). Moreover, the aggregate trend for ratings of one's preferred party for Sweden has been steadily downward in recent years (see Figure 3b) , thus paralleling the decline in perceived government responsiveness. Sweden has also experienced a rise in negative sentiment towards all traditional political parties, except for the new Green party, in recent years (see Figure 3b) . But, unlike the ratings of one's preferred party, indicators of dissatisfaction with the party system in general were very weakly associated, at the individual level, with political support. Although the correlations between regime support and affect towards one's preferred party in Sweden are not as strong as those found above with the distance measures, they do confirm the earlier findings on the importance of preferred party as a critical focus for discontent in Sweden.
In the United States and Norway low ratings of the incumbent party were consistently associated with distrust of government (see Table 5 ). More importantly, in these latter two countries, but not Sweden, those who rate all of the parties low express relatively little confidence in government. However, overall trends in ratings of the party system in Norway and the United States have diverged in recent years (compare the average rating of all parties in Figures 3a and 3c ), which partially explains the different trends for political support in these countries. In 1973 the Norwegian party system was quite negatively assessed relative to more recent years (see Table 6 ). Even those who support the Progressive party have become much more positive in their evaluations of the party system recently. In contrast, ratings of the party system in the United States have become increasingly negative (see Figure 4) . After 1976 affect towards both parties among strong identifiers did improve, but it was more than offset by the sharp rise in negative feelings among Independents.
In short, affective rejection of the party system, at least in Norway and the United States, appears to influence a broader sense of political alienation from government and the regime. Evidently a multi-party system does not prevent this relationship from developing. Even when people have numerous parties to choose from, some of them may be dissatisfied with all the alternatives. When that happens broader political support will suffer. The difference between these two countries, however, is that many fewer people are likely to be dissatisfied with all the parties in the multi-party system, thereby maintaining a higher overall level of regime support. Also, the evidence from supporters of the Progressive party shows that new parties not only help to reduce negative sentiment towards the party system, but indirectly increase confidence in government more generally.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF PARTY-RELATED FACTORS
The above analysis demonstrates that parties do play a significant role in influencing public attitudes towards government more generally. Several of the measures used to tap partisan attitudes, however, are potentially correlated. A multivariate analysis is therefore essential for drawing conclusions about the relative influence of these various factors on political support. Table 7 summarizes the results of an ordinary least squares analysis predicting political support in each of the countries examined. The variables incorporated in the equation include: the thermometer rating of the incumbent party, strength of party identification, neutral feelings towards parties, the average rating of all parties in the system, and ideological distance from the liberal and conservative parties or coalitions in each country. These variables were selected on the basis of the bivariate analysis and because of the hypotheses they represent. Briefly stated, the results of the regression analysis confirm what was suggested by the bivariate correlations presented above. Norway comes closest to a system that has been able to handle political turmoil effectively. Only in the early 1970s were there signs of broader discontent arising from negative assessments of the parties more generally. Since 1973, partly because of an expansion of the party system, dissatisfaction has been directed at the usual target of political vexation in a democracy -the governing party. 
;: 
S The distance measures were unavailable for 1981. The 'party same on issues' and 'important differences between parties' items were substituted.
The pattern of regression coefficients in Sweden and the United States, however, demonstrates that low political support was related to a distancing from the party system more generally, even after controlling for attitudes toward the incumbents. These results give reason for some concern. In Sweden the lack of partisan attachment and neutral feelings towards the parties showed consistent, negative effects on political support. Also, when ideological distance from one's preferred party was added to the prediction equation (analyses not presented here), it was significantly related to support, even after controlling for strength of partisanship. Moreover, even the perceived distance from Social Democrats was nearly insignificant when the preferred party measure was added to the equation. 29 In short, the usual incumbency pattern of relationships is very weak in Sweden. Instead, we find that low trust in government reflects a detachment from most political parties including one's own party.
The coefficients for the United States reveal that assessments of the party in power and a negative rejection of the party system independently influenced cynicism. As Wattenberg has previously demonstrated, feeling neutral towards the parties has no effect on political support in the United States. 30 However, rating both political parties negatively was consistently and strongly associated with distrust of government, even after controlling for ideological and affective assessments of the incumbents.
CONCLUSION
Assessments of political parties had a major effect on how responsive the public felt the government was in Norway, Sweden and the United States during the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. The specific impact varied, in theoretically interesting ways, from country to country. The empirical evidence suggests that structural differences in the party systems of the three countries were critical in determining the target, levels and trends in political dissatisfaction.
Partly identification was strongly related to political support in Norway but not in Sweden or the United States. These findings contradict earlier work which suggested that partisanship should generally be an important predictor of regime support. 31 Clearly, other factors mediate this impact.
Negative evaluations of the incumbent party in both Norway and the United States were consistently related to distrust, independent of party identification. But in the flexible multi-party system of Norway, distrust was channelled back into the electoral arena as support for the opposition and protest parties of the right. In the rigid two-party system of the United States, however, neither party produced popular solutions to enduring social issues, thus cynicism eventually reflected an accumulating discontent towards parties in general. In Sweden, on the other hand, the plummeting trust in government indicated apathy towards the inflexible multi-party system coupled with negative judgements of one's own party. Overall these findings imply that where there are major problems with mass political parties, confidence in government and support for regimes will suffer.
Democracies rely upon the institution of elections to maintain satisfaction with government as an arena of authoritative decision making. But, if the same social problems persist across a series of governments that are led by different parties, an increasing number of people come to believe that none of the parties reflect a particularly viable alternative. Compared to Norway, the United States and Swedish party systems have had little success in channelling discontent back into the normal political process. Perhaps the 1988 electoral gains of the Swedish Green party will eventually act to reduce the distrust in that country. As of now, the institution of elections has failed, during the past twenty years, to act as a mechanism for reducing the accumulating disaffection in either Sweden or the United States.
Concern about the declining legitimacy of Western democracies has received increasing scholarly attention in recent years. 32 Nevertheless, much of this work is purely descriptive. There is still a dearth of comparative research on the subject which tests alternative hypotheses or models that explain levels and trends in political support. The data presented above provide some preliminary findings about the relative magnitude of partisan effects that can be expected under different types of party systems. The evidence demonstrates that neither multi-party nor two-party systems are immune to declines in regime support. But they also suggest that flexible multi-party systems may cope more effectively over the long run than restrictive systems, whether multi-party or two-party. 33 Of course, party flexibility is not the only important factor in maintaining responsive government. A system may be so flexible that it is throughly fragmented, in which case it cannot provide the responsive representation of broader policy interests expected by citizens. Parties play an important role in aggregating interests and integrating citizens into the political community. But this is not achieved automatically or simply as a result of partisan identification. 32 For a review of this work see Dogan. Comparing Pluralist Democracies. 33 Moreover. a system that allows for the formation of new parties. with a reasonable chance of representation. provides a learning experience for the citizens. Dissatisfaction with the old parties, creation of one or more new parties, which subsequently elect representatives to the parliament. are the first steps in the chain that can integrate protest through the established avenues of political discourse. This can happen if the protest party is brought into normal. institutionalized politics and becomes a permanent member of the political structure. If the new party fails after a period of representation in the parliament. which has happened to some of the new parties in Denmark. the supporters of the failed party are likely to develop a more positive attitude towards the old system. partly because they had an opportunity to try an alternative and because one of the established parties will probably have shifted to adopt a position closer to the voters' preference.
We have argued theoretically and demonstrated empirically that there are a number of dimensions and targets of partisan evaluation which are more relevant than strength of partisanship for explaining levels of regime support. A sense of commitment to the parties and the regime, at least in part, are expressions of acceptable policy representation and of positive assessments of the incumbent's performance.
The comparative approach has also provided other insights which would not have been achieved by studying each country individually. For example, the evidence indicates that similar factors and processes were involved in the shifting levels of political trust in Norway, Sweden and the United States. This outcome reassures the validity, reliability and generalizability of the findings and conclusions. The comparison provides for a more substantial test of the theories and hypotheses describing citizen allegiance to political systems, or what Almond has labelled the 'system culture' of different countries. 34 Furthermore, since Norway exemplifies a recovery in trust while Sweden and the United States show downward trends, the evidence demonstrates that the same factors apply to explanations for both rising and falling political support. But, most importantly, the comparative approach calls our attention to the impact which institutional factors have on the level and change of political support. The comparison clarifies, for example, the critical role which the party structures played in how the political system responded to growing public disaffection.
Why is the debate about the institutional focus of political support so important? Partly because the evidence has indirect implications for understanding how democratic societies function. Of primary importance to this concern is knowledge about how change in political attitudes at the mass level affects the structure of political institutions -or how institutional factors influence the development of political attitudes which subsequently have consequences for the system. This relationship has compelling implications for the stability of the political regime but it is also indicative of how adaptive the system is to social change. The ability of a polity to survive considerable conflict is crucial. But in a democracy it is equally important to determine the conditions under which institutional stability comes to be seen as rigidity and unresponsiveness.
Does the evidence presented above suggest that shifting levels of political trust had institutional correlates and regime-level ramifications? In Easton's terminology do the changes in public attitudes documented above imply shifts in diffuse support or merely a change in specific support? If, as Easton suggests, the regime refers to the basic institutional structures, procedures and processes for resolving political conflicts, then the evidence appears adequate to argue that political disaffection was directed at these objects. In Norway the evidence is most conclusive. The dramatic change in the party system which produced a protest party of the right, a split in the Liberal party and the rise to prominence of the Conservative party was clearly linked with increased distrust. For the United States the survey data,taken alone, are less revealing, partly because the system is more complex and more rigid. But, when taken in conjunction with other, side evidence, it is more plausible to conclude that there were regime implications involved in the growing disaffection. The public outcry after 1968 for democratizing the candidate selection process by holding more primaries is but one example that reflects increased public distaste for parties and a growing feeling that politics needed closer scrutiny by citizens. In Sweden the growing detachment from parties and the marked deterioration of perceived government responsiveness also has major institutional implications. It has given rise to the Green party and produced a situation in which special interest organizations are likely to gain power relative to that for poli tical parties.
All of these outcomes reflect regime-level responses which indicate a lack of confidence in the usual procedure for decision making. What may have started out as a decline in specific support in these countries eventually came to influence diffuse support and the institutional arrangements of the political regimes. Certainly it is difficult to establish empirically a direct link between political trust and all of these institutional factors. But even if we stay within the strictest confines of the data presented above, there is substantial evidence that erosion in the measures of support goes well beyond dissatisfaction with the current incumbents. This is not to say that we would expect tremendous institutional change, let alone revolution, to accompany even a substantial decline of political trust in democracies as old as those in Norway, Sweden and the United States.
At the same time it would be a mistake to conclude that the increased distrust represented a superficial response to unpopular leaders or political rhetoric. In a democracy the statement that citizens do not trust their government is itself a grave matter. Such a message should not be taken lightly, because government is supposed to represent and be responsive to the best interests of the general public. If a majority of the citizens feel that this is no longer the case, then where is democracy?
APPENDIX
The American surveys were conducted by the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan; the Norwegian studies were carried out by Henry Valen of the Institute for Social Research in Oslo; and the Swedish studies by the Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. We thank the ICPSR, the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), the Swedish Social Science Data Service (SSD), Henry Valen and Soren Holmberg for making various data sets of each respective country available to us. In each country the survey sample includes a representative cross-section of adult eligible voters who were interviewed in person by professional interviewers. In short, the approach and design of the different studies are exactly comparable across the countries.
The support index in Norway contained three survey questions asking whether the government wasted taxes, whether leaders were dishonest and whether they were clever. Two items asking whether politicians were interested only in votes rather than people's opinions, and whether politicians cared about people, formed the index in Sweden. The US index also included two questions asking how often people could trust the government to do what is right and whether politicians cared about people. For Norway low trust was represented by giving zero or one trusting response to the three questions; high trust was indicated by trusting responses to all three items. For Sweden and the United States low trust means no positive responses whereas high trust means positive answers to both items.
The exact wording for the political support questions in each country is as follows: 
Norway

